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Burkhard Schafer 
Surveillance for the masses: the political 
and legal landscape of the UK 
Investigatory Powers Bill 
In March 2016, the UK Government put the Investigatory Powers Bill before 
Parliament. The new law, if enacted, will considerably increase the powers of law 
enforcement and security services regarding mass data retention, mass surveillance 
and mass hacking. This raises considerable concerns not just about the content of the 
Bill and its impact on privacy, but also about the method of its enactment and the ever 
diminishing parliamentary and judicial scrutiny of surveillance legislation in the UK. 
1 The Investigatory Powers Bill  
On March the 15th 2016, the Investigatory Powers Bill (IPB) 
passed its second reading at the House of Commons, the lower 
chamber of the British Parliament. The Bill, once enacted, will 
substantially increase the powers of UK intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies for targeted interception of communica-
tions, the bulk collection of communications data, and mass 
interception of communications. This marks for the time being 
the culmination of a process that formally started in November 
2015, when the draft Bill was first presented to Parliament. To 
understand the full significance of the new law however, we 
will have to go further back in history, tracing its ancestry back 
to the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act of 2014 
and the unsuccessful attempt in 2013 to enact the draft Com-
munications Data Bill.  
The Bill, in its present form, is a massive 229 pages long.1 In 
addition, the government published a 67 pages “explanatory 
note” that not only provides for the policy rationale, but also 
an explanation and interpretation of key terms and concepts. 
Even more importantly, the Bill comes with six Codes of Prac-
tice, totalling over 400 pages in length, which describe in more 
detail the implementation of the new powers, and any safe-
guards and restrictions that the agencies ought to observe. It is, 
obviously, impossible to give a detailed account of all the 
provisions in the IPB here. More detailed analysis and com-
prehensive resources can be found inter alia at the Media Poli-
cy Project of the LSE2 or the website of the Independent Re-
viewer for Terrorism Legislation.3 Instead, we will try to put 
the Bill in its historical and political context for German read-
ers, to enable them to see the proposal as a continuation of a 
                                                             
1 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/473770/Draft_Investigatory_Powers_Bill.pdf 
2 http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2016/01/05/some-things-old-
some-things-new-a-clause-by-clause-review-of-the-draft-investigatory-
powers-bill-investigatory-powers-research-group/ 
3 https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/investigatory-
powers-bill-the-major-issues/ 
theme of surveillance in Britain that sets it more and more 
apart from continental Europe. The paper will conclude with 
some thoughts on the issues that the IPB may face now that the 
UK has decided to leave the EU.   
2 From RIPA to IPB, a history of UK 
surveillance legislation 
While the IPB was submitted to Parliament by a conservative 
(Tory) government, Labour, as the main opposition party, has 
been generally muted in its criticism of the proposed legisla-
tion. To explain this and to understand the political process 
that shapes the current discussion of the Bill, we have to go 
back to at least 2000, when the then Labour government enact-
ed the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act RIPA. RIPA is 
currently the main legal framework governing surveillance and 
similar “data driven” investigative activities, including the 
interception of communications. Just as the present Bill, it was 
justified at the time by a perceived need to update police pow-
ers in line with technological change, such as the growth of 
electronic communication, strong encryption and the increas-
ing pervasiveness of large data sets such as CCTV records. 
From its inception, the Act was criticised by privacy advocates 
and academics for the wide range of powers it granted, and the 
weak system of oversight that it established for them.4   
RIPA complemented and underpinned considerable invest-
ment under the Labour government in surveillance technology 
and surveillance capabilities. It is best understood not just in 
the context of the growth of the Internet and the investigation 
of cybercrime, but the general growth of “evidence-led polic-
ing” and technology-enabled surveillance. At the time RIPA 
was enacted, the UK became e.g. the country with the world’s 
most extensive use of CCTV by public authorities for the 
                                                             
4 See e.g. Akdeniz, Y., Taylor, N. and Walker, C. (2001). "Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000: Bigbrother. gov. uk: State surveillance in the 
age of information and rights, Criminal Law Review 73-90; Reid, A.S. and 
Ryder, N. (2001). For Whose Eyes Only? A Critique of the United Kingdom's 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. Information & Communications 
Technology Law, 10(2), 179-201. 
purpose of crime prevention. RIPA not only provided the legal 
framework for the police to make use of these new surveil-
lance capabilities. As one of its most problematic aspects, it 
also granted considerable surveillance powers and data access 
rights to a plethora of public agencies, from local councils to 
the environmental agency, the gambling commission or the 
food standards authority. While intended to be used only in the 
prevention and investigation of serious crime and terrorism, it 
soon transpired that these authorities also used their newfound 
powers for much less pressing social issues such as dog foul-
ing or benefit fraud. This was often driven by one of the most 
problematic provisions in the Act, which allows surveillance 
not just for protection against national security threats and 
crime, but also for the prevention of “economic harm”.  
The combination of far-reaching surveillance powers under 
RIPA, a weak and fragmented supervisory system and the 
significant investment in and proliferation of surveillance 
technology caused the Information Commissioner Richard 
Thomas to warn that “Britain was sleepwalking into a surveil-
lance state”.5 In 2009, the House of Lords report „Surveillance: 
Citizens and the State“ painted, in over 300 pages, a dire pic-
ture of the increasing imbalance between privacy protection 
and state surveillance. Despite these criticisms from both in-
side Parliament and independent officials, the government 
stayed its course, marking also a power shift away from par-
liament and parliamentary scrutiny to a stronger executive. 
Britain’s “unwritten constitution” and its reliance on soft con-
ventions make it susceptible to this type of power shift.  
However, by 2009 and in the run-up to a general election, a 
marked shift in public perception had occurred. Widespread 
misuse of RIPA powers had made civil liberties an election 
issue for the British public. An unlikely alliance between liber-
tarian leaning members of the Conservative party and the 
Liberal Democrats, traditionally the party of civil liberties 
ensured that commitment to law reform became part of the 
election manifesto of both opposition parties. The election, 
highly unusual for Britain, did not give an overall majority to 
any party, forcing the Conservatives into a coalition govern-
ment with the Lib Dems – the first coalition government in 
living memory. With both parties committed to stronger pro-
tection of civil liberties and privacy, some commentators 
hoped for a sustained shift in the UK’s approach to police 
powers, while others, including the author in an earlier DuD 
contribution, remained sceptical.6 
The new government did indeed initially honour its manifes-
to pledges. The Identity Documents Act 2010 (c. 40) repealed 
the Identity Cards Act 2006 and in effect abolished the Identity 
Card Scheme, pushed by Labour against the objections of 
privacy advocates. The Protection of Freedoms Act (2012) 
reigned in DNA collection and CCTV surveillance.  
However, initial improvements soon gave way to a more 
surveillance friendly approach. The Interception Modernisa-
tion Programme, a programme from the dying days of the 
Labour government to extend the capabilities for interception 
and storage of communications data similar to the NSA Call 
                                                             
5 For a detailed discussion of this report see Schafer, B. (2009). 
Schlafwandelnd in den Überwachungsstaat?. Datenschutz und 
Datensicherheit-DuD, 33(8), 483-489. 
6 Schafer, B. (2011). All changed, changed utterly?. Datenschutz und 
Datensicherheit-DuD, 35(9), 634-638. 
Database, 7  was revived as “Communications Capabilities 
Development Programme” (CCDP).8 Its aim is to develop the 
capacity to log the meta-data of every telephone call, email 
and text message between UK residents extending the reach 
beyond conventional telecommunications media to social 
networking platforms such as Twitter.9 In parallel to providing 
significant funding for this project, the Home Office intro-
duced in 2012 the Draft Communications Data Bill as the 
enabling law for the programme. Dubbed by opposition and 
the media as a “snooper’s charta”, it would have required ISPs 
and mobile phone companies to keep records of Internet 
browsing activity, email correspondence, voice calls, Internet 
gaming, and mobile phone messaging services for 12 months. 
The Bill also contained provisions for data queries and data 
matching across different data sources, the “filter provisions” 
(similar to a “Rasterfahndung”) for a wide range of circum-
stances and reasons, including protection of “the economic 
wellbeing of the UK” in the absence of any specific threat.  In 
2013, the LibDems withdrew their support for the Bill, leaving 
the government without a majority and risking defeat in the 
House of Common. For the time being, the Bill was withdrawn 
– while work on the CCDP continued apace. 
 In the same year, the Snowden disclosures about PRISM 
revealed the extent of mass surveillance by the British security 
services, in particular GCHQ, and the extend of data sharing 
with the US security agencies. The legal basis for these activi-
ties remained questionable. The Snowden files showed inter 
alia that despite assurances given to Parliament, and arguably 
in violation of RIPA, UK security services had used raw data 
collected by the US services without a warrant signed by a 
minister of state. They also showed that GCHQ routinely col-
lected bulk communication meta-data. It is at least questiona-
ble if RIPA authorizes the collection of bulk data. For all its 
shortcomings, RIPA is still based on the ideal of targeted sur-
veillance of specified individuals who are under suspicion of 
having committed or are about to commit specific crimes. The 
activities taken by the security services were possibly based on 
a legally dubious “extensive” interpretation of the term “per-
son” in the RIPA provisions – so at least the conclusion 
reached in a review by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism 
Legislation, who remained highly critical of this interpreta-
tion.10 Alternatively, the mere collection of mass data might be 
deemed to fall short of “surveillance” for the purpose of RIPA, 
which would mean that as long as the data is not used or ac-
cessed, no warrant is required. This was the answer of the 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal, the judicial body charged under 
RIPA with adjudicating complaints against surveillance by 
public bodies. In response to complaints raised post-Snowden 
by Liberty, the Human Rights NGO, it ruled in late 2014 that 
bulk collection of data was not “surveillance” as long as the 
data was not seen by a human eye, and did therefore not raise 
legal issues. The tribunal did however confirm as an obiter that 
untargeted mass surveillance remained in principle impermis-
                                                             
7 See on the programme Walker, C. (2009). Data retention in the UK: 
Pragmatic and proportionate, or a step too far?. Computer Law & Security 
Review, 25(4), 325-334. 
8 See Edwards, L., Rauhofer, J., and Yar, M. (2013). Recent developments 
in UK cybercrime law. Handbook of Internet Crime, 413-436. 
9 Brown, I. (2012). Government access to private-sector data in the United 
Kingdom. International Data Privacy Law, ips018. 
10 David Anderson, A question of Trust, p. 96 
https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/IPR-Report-Print-Version.pdf. 
sible under that Act.11 In a later decision, it ruled furthermore 
that the warrantless data sharing between US and UK agencies 
had indeed been unlawful – but that paradoxically, the Snow-
den revelations had remedied this by creating the necessary 
“public knowledge” of the activity.12  
These decisions indicated that the regulatory and enforce-
ment regime of RIPA was insufficient to control security ser-
vices – either because they were able to ignore with impunity 
the law due to the weakness and fragmentation of the supervi-
sory agencies, or because the law was so restrictively worded 
that even highly problematic activities fell outside its remit.  
While the Lib Dems had been the traditional party of civil 
liberties, they found themselves in government with an in-
creasingly surveillance friendly senior partner just at a time 
when the Snowden revelations laid bare the degree of surveil-
lance in the UK – increasing the pressure from their own voter 
base to be more assertive and push back more aggressively 
against state intrusion into private communication.  
Finally, in August 2014, the European Court of Justice ruled 
in Digital Rights Ireland Ltd and Seitlinger and others, that the 
EU Data Retention Directive was incompatible with the rights 
to privacy and data protection under the Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights, and thus void. Since the Directive had been the 
basis of the data retention duties under RIPA, the decision also 
invalidated significant parts of the British legal surveillance 
framework. Rather than abandoning bulk surveillance though, 
the Home Office pushed for a different solution. In their read-
ing, the safeguards provided by RIPA made the UK surveil-
lance regime immune from challenges under the Charter. To 
maintain data gathering capacities and to continue data reten-
tion by UK ISPs, emergency legislation was introduced that 
restored the legal data retention duties that the voided Di-
rective had mandated. The Data Retention and Investigatory 
Powers Act 2014 (DRIP) was passed after minimal parliamen-
tary scrutiny on 14 July 2014 with cross-party support. Con-
servatives, Lib Dems and Labour overwhelmingly for the Bill, 
only the representatives of nationalist parties from devolved 
parts of the UK (The Scottish National Party, the Welsh Plaid 
Cymru and the Northern Irish SDLP) voted against.  
This indicated one of the constitutional law problems with 
this Bill, and the regulation of communication interception in 
the UK in general. Under e.g the Scotland Act 1998 that estab-
lished the devolved Scottish Parliament, Scotland has sole 
legislative competence in all issues not explicitly reserved to 
the UK government in Westminster under Schedule 5 of the 
Act. National defence, the security services and communica-
tion interception are such reserved matters under sec B8 of 
Schedule 5. However, policing and crime investigation are not. 
RIPA therefore has a UK and a Scottish (Irish, Welsh) dimen-
sion, and the devolved parliaments and assemblies will be 
charged with implementing parts of it. Despite this, there was 
no involvement with or consultation of the leaders of the de-
volved parliaments, and as the UK does not have an equivalent 
to the German Bundesrat or the US Senate, there is also no 
legislative body that directly involves the devolved regions in 
the legislative process at the federal, Westminster level. The 
                                                             
11 IPT judgement IPT/13/77/H http://www.ipt-uk.com/docs/IPT_13_168-
173_H.pdf. 
12 IPT/13/77/H.  For a critical analysis of both rulings  see Bernal, P, 
(2015). Liberty and others vs. GCHQ and others, Jusletter-IT http://jusletter-
it.weblaw.ch/en/issues/2015/24-September-2015.html. 
anomalies that this setup creates became visible in the discus-
sion on DRIP. 
Constitutional concerns, however, also marred the very pro-
cess chosen to enact DRIP. Submitting the law as emergency 
legislation meant minimal parliamentary scrutiny, restricting 
debate to just four days. Several commentators pointed out that 
the crisis was largely manufactured by the Home Office which 
apparently had not followed the progression of the Digital 
Rights Ireland case at court, and even after the verdict was 
given initially delayed its response by several months. Shami 
Chakrabarti, the then director of Liberty, spoke about “an 
essay crisis rather than a national crisis”, aptly comparing the 
Home Office to a student who waited too long before doing 
their assessment. 13  Parliamentarians from all parties echoed 
this concern. However, in the absence of a written constitution 
and a Supreme Court that can enforce procedural rules, in the 
UK context this is seen as primarily a political, not a legal 
question. 
The government justified its stance by claiming that DRIP 
only reaffirmed powers already granted under RIPA, which 
had been before Parliament. This however not only ignored the 
changing landscape created by the CJE decision, it was also 
based on a problematic reading of RIPA powers. On the face 
of it, DRIP extended existing interception powers under RIPA 
in at least two ways: it extended the territorial scope of the 
provisions significantly, by granting new powers to force 
overseas companies to store communication data and assist 
UK authorities with interception capacities. Secondly, it ex-
tended the scope of companies that could be compelled to 
assist the police beyond traditional communication providers 
to social media platforms and other online service providers. 
According to the government, these powers had been implicit 
in the wording of RIPA, but neither a plain text reading of the 
law, nor a consultation of the traveaux preparatoires or the 
Parliamentary discussion supports that interpretation.14 There 
were a number of concessions made for unhappy backbenchers 
amongst the main parties. Most importantly, the Act came with 
a sunset clause of one year, which at the time was seen as a 
small victory for privacy advocates, but would prove to be a 
double edged sword. The Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation 
was tasked with providing the above-cited comprehensive 
report on surveillance legislation in the UK. Finally, a new, 
independent Civil Liberties and Privacy Tribunal was prom-
ised to exercise some substantial oversight – however, this was 
not enshrined in the eventual Act, and has by now been aban-
doned.  
The Lib Dem leadership and their government ministers en-
dorsed the Bill, the constitutionality of the process by which it 
was enacted, and its interpretation by the Home Office in the 
face of considerable opposition by their own followers. This 
position became even more difficult to maintain when two 
MPs, from Labour and the Tory party, mounted a successful 
legal challenge to the High Court. On the 17th July 2015, in  
David Davis and others v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, the court ruled that DRIP was incompatible with 
EU privacy and human rights law.15 The decision, which is 
                                                             
13 https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/news/blog/drip-effect 
14 See e.g. Grossman, W.M. " Emergency" Ushers in a New Era in British 
Communications Surveillance. IEEE Security & Privacy 6 (2014): 84-88;  
15 https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/davis_judgment.pdf 
under appeal by the government, ordered that sections 1 and 2 
be not applied, but suspended the enforcement of the decision 
until 31 March 2016. The purpose is to give the government 
the option to redraft the section to make it compatible with EU 
law.  
It was against this background that the country went into a 
general election. The Lib Dems had prevented the “Snooper’s 
Charta” in 2012, but the more recent memory for their voters 
and grassroots members was their acquiescence to DRIP and 
their support for a process that played at the very least fast and 
loose with the constitution, and compromised the role of Par-
liament. The Snowden revelations, which at any other time 
could have boosted their support as a rallying point for civil 
liberty and privacy advocates, wrong-footed them entirely. As 
junior partner in a conservative government, they had little 
leeway in mounting an overt confrontation with the Home 
Office or to criticize the government without formally leaving 
the coalition. The punishment by the electorate was brutal and 
eliminated them as a power in UK politics. They lost 49 of 
their 57 seats, and while civil liberty and DRIP was only one 
amongst several reasons, it contributed considerably to the 
dissatisfaction amongst their own supporters. One result of the 
collapse of the Lib Dem vote was an absolute majority for the 
conservatives, who now faced the task of addressing the law 
on data retention unencumbered by a coalition partner.  
As of summer of 2015, the UK legal framework on data col-
lection and police surveillance was in tatters. The sunset clause 
of DRIPA meant action was needed to keep the data retention 
capabilities of the UK security services, even without the High 
Court challenge. The report by the Reviewer of Terrorism 
Legislation had painted a dire picture of the efficiency of RIPA 
and the bodies charged with enforcing/supervising it, declaring 
the need for a root and branch revision of a failing system 
never fit for its purpose: neither sufficiently clearly allowing 
forms of surveillance deemed necessary by the security ser-
vices, nor providing a robust supervisory mechanism that 
would ensure that the police and security services used their 
legal powers correctly.  Snowden had shown that the UK secu-
rity services either ignored the legal framework altogether, or 
used an overly wide interpretation of the law. The CJEU had 
called into question the legality of all forms of undirected bulk 
surveillance. 
In this political environment, the Home Office revived the 
2013 Draft Communications Data Bill, combining the data 
retention and mass surveillance powers proposed then with a 
new and, arguably, more stringent form of judicial control and 
a more streamlined oversight regime. Rather than following 
the lead of the CJEU and indeed the UK Investigatory Powers 
Tribunal, the answer was to further extend surveillance pow-
ers, but this time with a proper legal basis and formal process 
of judicial supervision. As with DRIP, the government contin-
ued the policy of minimizing substantial parliamentary over-
sight wherever possible. A first draft for consultation was 
published late in November 2015, with a proposed first reading 
of the Bill in February 2016. This gave MPs, parliamentary 
committees and NGOs just little over two months – and over 
the Christmas holidays – to digest and analyze a mammoth Bill 
of over 200 pages, and with over 400 pages of further codes of 
practice.  
Despite this short time frame, public criticism both from 
within and outside parliament quickly mounted. The Joint 
Select Committee for the Investigatory Powers Bill, the par-
liamentary committee charged with conducting the public 
consultation, received 148 submissions, running to over 1500 
pages, most of them highly critical of both the procedure of 
enactment and the substance of the proposal.16 The committee 
itself recommended in its report 86 partly substantial chang-
es.17 The Intelligence and Security Committee, chaired by a 
former Attorney General and generally friendly towards the 
security services was even more scathing. It noted that the 
committee had endorsed the principle of bulk data retention in 
its earlier report, Privacy and Security: A modern and trans-
parent legal framework, provided a suitable regulatory envi-
ronment was created. 18 On the proposal, it notes:19  
“The Committee is disappointed to note that it does not cov-
er all the Agencies’ intrusive capabilities. [...]. This is – in our 
view – a significant missed opportunity” 
Regarding privacy in particular, it states that “Overall, the 
privacy protections are inconsistent and in our view need 
strengthening.” The government’s reaction to these criticisms 
of the privacy regime of the Bill was one of contempt – it 
added the word “privacy” to the header of the Bill that intro-
duces the judicial warrant requirement. 
.  
3 The IPB: The main features 
As we saw, the IPB pursues a threefold aim. First, it consoli-
dates existing police powers, regulated currently by a number 
of specific laws, in one piece of legislation. Second, it “up-
dates” these powers to bring them in line with the “digital age” 
– in the words of the government, to “restore capabilities that 
have been lost as a result of changes in the way people com-
municate”. 20  Third, it also consolidates several supervisory 
bodies, including the Interception of Communications Com-
missioner and the Chief Surveillance Commissioner (CSC) in 
one new agency, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner 
(IPC) whose role it will be to oversee how these powers are 
used. 
These three main aims – consolidation, authorisation, and 
regulation, can help us to structure the more detailed provi-
sions that the Bill proposes. 
Consolidation: The IPB combines police powers currently 
exercised either under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
Act (RIPA), the Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006 or the Data 
Retention and Investigatory Powers Act (DRIPA) 2014 as the 
main authorizing provisions.  Other piecemeal powers that are 
affected are sec 94 of the Telecommunications Act 1984 (par-
ticular important for our discussion below, as it empowered the 
Secretary of State to give “directions” to telecommunication 
providers, which could include requests for technological 
                                                             
16 http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/draft-
investigatory-powers-bill/written-evidence-draft-investigatory-powers-
committee.pdf 
17 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201516/jtselect/jtinvpowers/93/930
2.htm 
18 isc.independent.gov.uk/files/20150312_ISC_P+S+Rpt(web).pdf 
19 http://isc.independent.gov.uk/files/20160209_ISC_Rpt_IPBill(web).pdf p 
5-6 
20 Foreword to the Investigatory Powers Bill by the Home Secretary, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/473770/Draft_Investigatory_Powers_Bill.pdf at p. 5. 
assistance); the Justice and Security Act 2013; sections 15 and 
16 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE); and 
section 37 of the Supreme Courts Act 1981. The last two are 
general powers of UK courts to grant search orders, which can 
include searching and seizing computer equipment and files. 
Affected are also powers given under the Intelligence Services 
Act (ISA) 1994 – these pertain to the authorisation of “com-
puter network exploitation” or hacking..  
Authorisation: This aspect of the Bill is unsurprisingly the 
most contentious, creating far reaching new powers for the 
police and duties for communication service providers. In 
particular, the Bill lays out the conditions and procedures 
under which warrants can be obtained for  
 the interception of communications, 
 the mandatory retention and acquisition of communications 
data, 
 equipment interference (hacking)  
 the retention and examination of bulk personal datasets. 
 “filter search” across several data sets 
In each of these cases, warrants can be obtained for targeted 
and bulk surveillance, including bulk hacking which could 
compromise entire communication networks. CSPs can be 
compelled to assist in the hacking of accounts of their custom-
ers, and it seems possible that third parties with relevant exper-
tise can be drafted into assisting the police and security ser-
vices. This aspect of the Bill echoes the use of the ancient “All 
Writs Act” in the recent litigation between Apple and the FBI, 
or even more the subsequent legislative proposal by senators 
Burr and Feinstein, the “Compliance with Court Orders Act of 
2016,” which would enable courts to force any third party to 
assist police in circumventing encryption or similar privacy 
and security enhancing methods.21 The IPB also creates a new 
criminal offence of disclosing data requests made under the 
IPB to the target of the investigation, third parties or the public 
– potentially criminalizing whistleblowing. In this respect the 
IPBs approach to privacy falls well behind even the normal US 
attitude whose reliance on the political process permits greater 
transparency. 
 The data retention warrant will require communication ser-
vice providers to retain "Internet connection records" – the 
meta-data of which websites were visited for all UK users, and 
for 12 months duration. The particular pages and the full 
browsing history will not be kept. While warrants for various 
surveillance activities are at the heart of the Bill, police and 
intelligence officers will have the right to see these records as 
part of a targeted and filtered investigation, without a warrant.  
Warrants can be obtained if this is 
1. in the interest of national security; 
2. needed for preventing or detecting serious crime; 
3. required to fulfil duties under a mutual assistance agreement 
with a foreign agency;  
4. safeguarding the economic well-being of the UK (in circum-
stances relevant to the interests of national security) 
1) and 2) are ill defined and have in the past been interpreted 
broadly by police (regarding “seriousness” of crime) and secu-
rity services (regarding the term “national interest”. 3) could, 
as in the past, circumvent domestic legal restraints – sharing 
data with the US that does not meet any of the other require-
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https://josephhall.org/f0eabaa89b8ee38577bf7d0fd50ddf0d58ecd27a/307378
123-Burr-Encryption-Bill-Discussion-Draft.pdf 
ments, only to receive it “back” again from them. 4) is the 
revised version of a corresponding clause in RIPA, which had 
resulted in particularly problematic abuse of surveillance pow-
ers. The Bill improves the existing situation to a degree here, 
by clarifying that the economic interests must be important 
enough to be of relevance for national security – though what 
this then adds to 1) remains unclear.  
Control: While the IPB widens considerable the surveillance 
powers of police and security services, the “deal” that was 
suggested by the Reviewer of Terrorism legislation was to 
balance this by a more stringent system of approvals and su-
pervision. The Bill follows this suggestion to a degree. It sim-
plifies and strengthens the supervisory regime, as indicated, by 
uniting the roles of several agencies in the hand of one new 
body, the Investigatory Powers Commission which will com-
bine and replace the powers of the current Interception of 
Communications Commissioner, Intelligence Services Com-
missioner, and Chief Surveillance Commissioner. The Intelli-
gence and Security Committee of Parliament and the Investi-
gatory Powers Tribunal retain their various roles. 
The IPC will consist of a number of serving or former senior 
judges, the Judicial Commissioners. Its main role will be to 
provide a so called “double lock”: while under RIPA a politi-
cian, the Home Secretary, signs off on all warrants, under the 
IPB, both the signature of a Judicial Commissioner and the 
Home Secretary are needed. In addition to the authorization of 
investigatory activities, the IPC will also have an inspection 
role and far reaching freedom to define the scope and process 
of this inspection process. The IPC will audit compliance and 
undertake investigations. However, the Bill is silent on the 
powers the IPC will have to compel the cooperation of security 
services or police. Finally, the Commissioner will have a man-
date to inform Parliament and the public about the need for 
and use of investigatory powers. The Bill mandates that the 
Prime Minister appoints the Information Powers Commission-
er – but gives him/her discretion as to the number of other 
commissioners that will be appointed, leaving the agency 
potentially overworked.  
Given the central role of the IPC Commissioner, the ap-
pointment process also raises the same constitutional issue that 
we discussed above regarding DRIP: while the Prime Minister 
has to consult with and inform the heads of the Scottish, Irish 
and Welsh devolved executives, they have no veto over the 
appointment or any other direct influence in the appointment 
process. The UK parliament too remains sidelined – it neither 
plays a role in the appointment process nor can it call the IPC 
to account.  
4 Evaluation and outlook: a view from 
the outside 
The IPB undoubtedly increases the surveillance capabilities of 
British police and security services considerably – or ex-
pressed more cautiously, puts capabilities that have been used 
for some time now on a legal footing. Privacy advocates can 
find some consolation in a strengthened and more transparent 
supervisory system, where politicians at least have to share 
some of the power with independent judges. But the IPB does 
not only affect the UK. Just as with DRIP, some of its provi-
sions create an extraterritorial reach of UK surveillance law, in 
particular vis-à-vis UK domiciled companies with international 
business. For the UN, the special rapporteur on privacy heavily 
criticised the Bill, expressing his hope “that disproportionate, 
privacy-intrusive measures such as bulk surveillance and bulk 
hacking as contemplated in the investigatory powers bill be 
outlawed rather an legitimised.”22 This for sure was the lesson 
other EU countries took from Digital Rights Ireland.  
The question though is, does this still matter? On June 
23.6.2016, the UK decided with a 51.9% to 48.1 majority to 
end its membership of the EU. Since then, the Prime Minister 
has resigned, and while the necessary Art 50 notification that 
triggers the two year negotiation process has not yet been 
issued, it seems inevitable now that the UK will leave the 
Union sooner or later. Crucially, though, it is at this point 
unknown what the negotiation position of the UK will be, or 
indeed if it will emerge only after a general election is called.  
Several outcomes are possible. In one scenario, the UK re-
mains member of the EEA in a position similar to Norway. In 
this case, the UK would have to observe all relevant EU regu-
lations. It is at least questionable if the IPB is compliant with 
EU Data Protection law, even though civil servants have 
pointed out privately to the author that this was an explicit 
goal, and one reason for adding substantial new procedural 
safeguards. This emphasis of “post collection” safeguards in 
data use however, much in line with the US reliance on 4th 
Amendment restraints, misreads partly the European concern 
with bulk data collection. The UK also struggles to see privacy  
mainly as an Art 8 human right, and focus almost exclusively 
on more technical compliance issues with the Data Protection 
Directive. the British exit means that the country will not any 
longer be subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Justice, but leaving aside the possibility that the UK could also 
withdraw from the ECHR – an idea that was in the past moot-
ed by the Home Secretary, now frontrunner to become the next 
Prime Minister – the UK would still need to observe the evolv-
ing EU understanding of privacy as a human right, either 
through the ECHR case law or in order to maintain access to 
the EEA. In fact, the UK withdrawal could also mean in a 
stronger and faster development of EU Data Protection law, 
the UK having been in the past one of the more industry and 
police friendly negotiators.  
 The most radical scenario, favoured by the UK Independ-
ence Party, is a “full brexit”, with the relation between the UK 
and Europe governed solely by WTO rules. In this case, the 
EU and UK would have to negotiate a separate “Privacy 
Shield” agreement if data sharing remains possible – some-
thing the UK cannot possibly afford to forgo. In Schrems v 
Data Protection Commissioner,23 the CJEU had ruled the safe 
harbour agreement with the US invalid. Mass retention of data 
and the data sharing arrangements with the police were at the 
core of the decision.24  The IPB provides for the same powers. 
And even though it introduces judicial oversight, these too 
remain if anything weaker than their US counterparts. Privacy 
Shield, the successor agreement to Safe Harbour, was pub-
lished the same month as the IPB reached parliament. Despite 
concerns by privacy advocates, even a weak Privacy Shield 
                                                             
22 http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2015-11/10/surveillance-
investigatory-powers-scary-joseph-cannataci 
23 Judgment in Case C-362/14. 
24 Loideain, N N. (2015). EU Law and Mass Internet Metadata Surveillance 
in the Post-Snowden Era. Media and Communication, 3(2). 
seems incompatible with the IPB. Bulk data collection is dis-
couraged, and where permitted then only to counter six explic-
itly defined serious threats, a much narrower range than pro-
vided under the IPB and its “economic interest” test.25  
Even if we assume that Privacy Shield passes scrutiny by the 
CJEU, the UK and the IPB would struggle to be seen PS-
compliant. At the same time, a UK-EU agreement could be 
more demanding than PS.  Unlike the US, the `UK has no 
economic leverage – EU citizens do not depend on UK plat-
forms the way they depend on Facebook or Twitter, and the 
US does not depend on the UK market the same way it needs 
access to the EU.26 The UK would likely struggle to negotiate 
a deal as generous as Privacy Shield. This leaves the admin-
istration heavy and costly solution of using the EU Model 
clauses for Data Transfer.  In the meantime UK companies are 
likely to pre-empt the negotiations by setting up independent 
subsidiaries on the continent – following the example of US 
companies after Schrems. Many data-intensive industries, in 
particular the banking sector, are likely to favour this move 
anyway once free movement of services stops. The IPB per-
mits bulk data collection “if needed to prevent economic 
harm” to the UK – it would be a supreme irony if the IPB 
turned out to be a major threat to what is currently the largest 
Internet economy of the G20.27 
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